Burma's Conflict in a Nutshell: Burma/Myanmar Backgrounder
Prepared by the Free Burma Coalition
30 September 2005
Historical Background
Burma, renamed Myanmar in 1989 which, as a matter of fact, is in accord with the Burmese linguistic and historical tradition of the country's dominant ethnic group - Bama or Myanmar - is a typical 'Third World' nation-state: it is poor and conflict-ridden; it is endowed with rich natural resources such as gas, jade, rubies, copper, uranium and oil; it has fertile and alluvial soil and houses most of the world's remaining teak forests. Its multi-ethnic society embodies a wide variety of historical, linguistic and political traditions.
Since independence, the country's local post-colonial elites of all ideological stripes and ethnic backgrounds have been struggling to pursue their often-conflicting visions for the country as a whole (as in the case of the dominant Burman elites, civilian or soldier) or narrower ethno-nationalist visions for their mono-ethnic group (as in the case of most or all non-dominant ethnic groups, armed and unarmed).
Consequently, the country's transition from a colonial polity with the British-developed capitalist economy to a newly independent, nationalistic welfare nation-state in the post-World War II period has not been a happy occasion. Although Burma (Myanmar) was not a still-born at birth, that is, upon independence in 1948, its political maturation process, as well as economic development has been stunted by both internecine ideological and ethnic conflicts and aggressive meddling of foreign powers, specifically Thailand, Mao's China and the Cold War-era United States.
The country's less than successful nation building efforts need to be understood properly against the backdrop of the following historical and socio-political factors that have come to define the nature of local politics, both in form and content:
- 125-years of British colonial rule characterized by political domination, psychological subjugation, economic exploitation, and over-ethnicization of the politics among local intra and inter-ethnic communities and 3 short but devastating years under the military occupation by Fascist Japan on the eve of the World War II;
- The spill-over impact of the Cold War, most specifically 4-decades of Beijing-supported Burmese Communist insurgency which collapsed in 1989 and the Central Intelligence Agency-backed Kuomintang resistance which set up its military bases and the nucleus of the present-day narcotic industry on Burmese soil in order to self-finance its military operations against Mao's China;
- Thailand's twofold use of the armed ethnic minority insurgencies for nearly 4-decades, which dotted - and continue to do so - the long and porous Burmese-Thai borders, as both military buffers against the historically hostile Burman State and as cross-border trade partners in arms, teak, gem stones, agricultural and forest products, as well as consumer goods;
- India's ideological and financial support of successive pro-democratic revolts by Burman politicians in exile (such as the deposed Prime Minister U Nu) and freedom fighters against the military rule (including both the non-violent leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the Burmese hijackers), since the early 1970s until early 1990s;
- And last but not least the deeply-rooted authoritarian socio-political traditions that permeate, without any exception, throughout Burma's communities, both the dominant Burman ethnic group and non-Burman ethnic communities, irrespective of their institutional backgrounds either as civilian politicians or soldiers.
The Main Issues Confronting Burma (Myanmar)
The single most fundamental barrier in ending the 15-years-old political deadlock in Burma is the fact that key power holders, that is, the generals and officer corps and their challengers (and by extension, their respective constituencies and external and domestic supporters) do not speak the same language, thereby continuing to talk past one another.
Military Perspective
The State Peace and Development Council, the ruling junta (and the rank and file of the Armed Forces), speaks - and understands - only the language of 'national security'.
Democratic Forces
The civilian democratic forces, both the mainstream pro-democracy groups led by Aung San Suu Kyi and the ethnic minority groups, speak the language of "political reforms, economic liberalization and human rights".
In this situation, the dialogue will be neither fruitful nor feasible.
If the country is to move forward both economically and politically - along the lines of a liberal democracy - the above-mentioned political actors will have to establish a common political language, integrating concerns and interests of each group, legitimate and valid from the perspective of each group.
Western Policy and Its Consequences
Through the eyes of the generals (and their rank and file members), the West is using the Burmese opposition, both armed ethnic minority organizations, and Aung San Suu Kyi-led civilian opposition groups, as proxy organizations to push for their ideological and political agendas while pursuing their political initiatives disguised as human rights concerns and issues through international agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF, as well as the International Labor Organization and the UN Human Rights Commission.
The Double Standards Problem
The West - EU and US and Canada - doesn't have significant strategic interests in Burma. Accordingly, it has adopted policies that reflect liberal values. While it has engaged with other regimes that are equally or more authoritarian (for instance, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Nepal, or Uzbekistan) it has shamed, condemned, isolated or shunned the Burmese at every opportunity.
The apparent double-standards have led to the feeling on the part of the Burmese military leadership, however perverse and twisted it may sound, of unjust and unfair treatment internationally at the hands of the Western nations, especially Washington and, to a lesser extent, the European Union.
The Drug Policy Example
One of the concrete instances which have convinced the Burmese generals that Washington is waging an economic and political war against them is the Cubanization of US drug policy toward Burma. By empirical and objective measures, the narcotic production and export in Burma under the military regime has gone down significantly while the narcotic production in Afghanistan under the U.S.-backed post-Taliban government has increased.
The Burma lobby in Washington is made up mostly of American lobbyists which pushes for maximal demands and conditions and holds the views that only the regime's demise through 'a people power revolt' - not the peaceful, evolutionary process - will pave the way for democratic and economic development of Burma to be overseen and managed by Aung San Suu Kyi.
The Way Forward
If the West is serious about helping to move Burma along liberal democratic path, it must explore constructive ways to address, in a strategic and integrated manner, both the regime's national security concerns (as well as their individual and corporate interests) and the sorry state of human security issues.
Its policy so far has been almost entirely based on a single event - multiparty elections held 15 years ago and won by Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy -, at the detriment of democratization as a process. Timothy Garton Ash, Oxford University historian and an astute student of democratic revolutions, has perceptively remarked that "elections are the roof of a democracy, not its foundations."
The greatest irony: The very pro-democracy and pro-reform policy may be further undermining the political and economic evolution of that country by refusing to integrate and address the national security issues which successive military leaderships in Burma since independence hold with utmost sincerity and intensity.
Prolonged economic sanctions and political and diplomatic isolation of authoritarian regimes whose concerns are national security - as opposed to reforms - damage the prospects and possibilities of democratization. For the very measures or policy tools designed to pressure these security-obsessed regimes to reform harm the emergence of civic, economic, administrative, intellectual, public health and cultural institutions which are part and parcel of an organic - not externally imposed - democracy.