An EU Strategy for Burma/Myanmar?

by Ham Yawnghwe

October 18, 2005

It is difficult to talk about a European Union strategy for Burma/Myanmar when everything about the country is so politicised and polarised - be it HIV/AIDS, humanitarian aid, or drug eradication, not to mention sanctions or political engagement. A simple well-meaning action or statement can take on unintended complex consequences and draw intense criticism from all quarters.

The United Nations Global Fund to combat HIV-AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria in Myanmar has become the latest victim in this 'Burma war'. It is a battle where one is more likely to be killed by 'friendly' fire than by enemy fire.

EU-Burma Relations in Review

The European Union's policy towards Burma/Myanmar has unfortunately been a reactive one rather than a carefully thought through strategy. This is sadly true of the Burmese democracy movement as a whole, as well as of the international community at large.

Timeline of EU Actions

1988

When the Burmese military (SLORC) seized power killing thousands, the EU reacted by suspending all bilateral aid.

1990-1991

When the SLORC held general elections, lost by a landslide and decided to ignore the election results, the EU reacted by imposing an arms embargo and suspending defence co-operation.

1996

The EU adopted its first Common Position on Burma/Myanmar in October 1996, but the policy was out of sync with what was actually happening politically on the ground in Yangon.

1997

The EU withdrew General System of Preferences (GSP) trade privileges from Burma/Myanmar. This was also the year Burma/Myanmar became a member of ASEAN, creating tensions between EU and ASEAN relations.

The ASEAN Challenge

The issue of Burma/Myanmar became a bone of contention between the EU and ASEAN and it affected their long-term relationship for many years. The EU position on Burma/Myanmar took a strange turn in 2004 when the EU threatened to boycott ASEM if Burma/Myanmar was included.

When ASEAN called their bluff, the EU had to agree to Burma/Myanmar participating in the ASEM summit, though on a level below that of Head of State or Government.

Current Challenges

Burma/Myanmar is becoming a major obstacle in the EU's relationship with ASEAN and its east Asian partners - namely China, Japan and South Korea.

While EU exports to Burma/Myanmar are negligible, totalling 54 million in 2003, and imports from Burma/Myanmar totalled only 388 million, the socio-economic conditions in Burma/Myanmar are also worrying. There is a high risk of instability. Former Commissioner Chris Patten has stated that we could be witnessing the development of a failed state in Burma/Myanmar.

Recommendations

First

The EU nations need to agree that the issue of Burma/Myanmar is no longer just an internal affair concerning democracy and human rights. They need to agree that Burma/Myanmar has been a key obstacle in developing better EU relations with ASEAN, and it is becoming an obstacle in developing better EU relations with East Asia.

Second

The EU as a whole needs to decide what are its key interests in Burma/Myanmar separate and perhaps distinct from those of Burmese democracy advocates. Are these political - democracy and human rights; strategic; economic; or humanitarian?

Third

The EU needs to decide on who or what agency within the EU should have the primary responsibility for dealing with the issue of Burma/Myanmar.

Fourth

The EU needs to develop a strategic plan to ensure that its primary interests in Burma/Myanmar are served, recognising that it may not have sufficient credibility or political clout with the Burmese generals to achieve its objectives.

The EU needs to move away from the sanctions debate. Whether sanctions work or not, is not a relevant topic. The EU needs to look at the issue from a different perspective and identify its key interests.

The Reality on the Ground

It is clear that the generals in Burma/Myanmar will not give up power regardless of whether or not there are sanctions. Sanctions like the US ban on imports have clearly hurt the textile industry in Burma/Myanmar. But the Burmese generals intend to survive, no matter what or whom is affected by the sanctions.

To them, their own survival and the survival of the 'tatmadaw' is synonymous with the survival of the nation. The problem is that the generals can continue to survive for a long time, whereas, the reality is that the nation as a whole may not survive.

The country may disintegrate because of the social and economic strains, and the vacuum created could be filled by one or more of the neighbouring countries.

Key Questions for the EU

  • How can the disintegration of Burma/Myanmar and instability in the region be avoided?
  • Can the generals be convinced of the need to change in order to 'save' the nation?
  • What would convince them?
  • How can they be approached?
  • Who should approach them?
  • When would be a good time to do so?

Changing Perceptions

EU Perspective

The EU sees the Burma/Myanmar issue as one of democracy and human rights versus authoritarian military rule.

Regional Perspective

Burma/Myanmar's neighbours in ASEAN and China see it as an issue of western/north/superpower nations trying to impose their will on smaller weaker nations.

If this perception is not changed, neither the EU nor the United Nations will get much support from ASEAN or China in spite of their concern for what is developing into a regional problem.

The EU needs to explore in greater depth to what extent it can work with the people of Burma/Myanmar including the military, and its neighbours to bring about the desired change that will serve both the interests of the EU and that of Burma/Myanmar.

However, whatever the EU does, it can no longer afford to continue to manage the Burma/Myanmar issue on an ad hoc basis.

About the Author

Ham Yawnghwe

Director of the Euro-Burma Office in Brussels